§１　導入：「あなたは相対主義者ですか」と問う理由：
§２　相対主義とは何か？
§３　クーンのパラダイム論あるいは概念枠相対主義
§４　Davidson による概念枠相対主義への批判
§５　パラダイムの共約不可能性と Davidson の概念枠批判の関係の考察
§６　New　Relativism

§７　問題感受性

1　新相対主義とこれまでの考察の関係
新相対主義 への批判
意見の違いがあるときに、Content の理解が異なるのか、それとも同一の Content に対する Assessment が異なるのか、を区別できないのではないか？

＃新相対主義の特徴
相対主義とは、両立しない二つ以上の主張がともに真であることを認める立場である。このときそれぞれの真理性は、絶対的な真理ではなく、相対的な真理であることになる。その意味で、相対主義と呼ばれる。あるいは、両立しない二つ以上の主張がともに真であることを認めるとき、それらは何かに対する相対的な真理として主張される。それゆえに、それは相対主義と呼ばれる。**新相対主義**の場合、真理は、評価基準に相対的であることを主張することになる。

＃これまでの考察との関連付け
　プロタゴラスの相対主義においては、人間が万物の尺度であって、命題 P の真理値が人によって異なるとき、命題 P の内容の理解が人によって異なるとすると、それは文脈主義であり、内容は同一であるが、評価の尺度が人によって異なるのだとすると、新相対主義となる。
　パラダイムの共約不可能性による相対主義は、科学理論の真理性が、パラダイムによって異なるとき、命題 P の理解がパラダイムによって異なると考えられているので、それは文脈主義の一種であるだろう。しかし、パラダイムが異なるとき、問題の重要性の評価が異なることが強調される。この**問題の評価の相対性について**は、文脈主義／新相対主義の区別では分析できないように思われる。
　デイヴィドソンの概念枠組み相対主義批判は、異なる概念枠組間であっても相互翻訳可能であると主張する。

ローティは、次のように述べていた。
　　「ニュートンは、アリストテレスが間違って答えた問題に正しい解答をあたえたのだろうか。それとも彼らは別の問いをたてていたのだろうか。」（ローティ『哲学と自然の鏡』野家啓一産業図書、305）
　　「ここには確定した答えがあるはずだと考える理由は、さしあたり大雑把に言えば、真理追及の歴史は詩歌や政治や衣服の歴史とは異なっているはずだと考えるところにある。」306
ローティは、この箇所で、二つの科学理論が同じ問いを問うているのか、異なる問いを問うているのかという問いに対する確定した答えはない、と考えている。
　しかし、第七章第 1 節では、次のように述べていた。
　　「「共約可能」ということで私が意味しているのは、諸言明が衝突しあうと思われるあらゆる点に関する論争

を決着するに際して、いかにしたら合理的一致が得られるのかを示すような一連の規則をわれわれが持ちうる、ということである。これらの規則は、除去できなかったあらゆる不一致が「非認識的なもの」か、たんなる言葉上のものか、あるいはさもなければ単に一時的なものにすぎない──もっと努力すれば解決できるもの──かのいずれかであると判別するような、理想的状況の構成方法を示してくれる。」(368)

ここでの「共約可能」というのは、意見の不一致が、言語の違いなのか、意見の違いなのか、決定できるということだろう。もし、意見の不一致と言語の違いを区別できるとすると上記の問題「ニュートンは、アリストテレスが間違って答えた問題に正しい解答をあたえたのだろうか、それとも彼らは別の問いをたてていたのだろうか。」に答えられるのではないか。しかし、ローティは、これに答えられないと述べていた。そうするとこの二か所は、矛盾しないだろうか。

デイヴィドソンならば、一つの言語の中で、アリストテレス力学とニュートン力学と相対性理論をともに表現できると考えるだろう。このとき、デイヴィドソンは、これらが異なる問いに答えていると考えるのだろうか、それとも同一の問いに対する異なる答えだと考えるのだろうか。

もし後者ならば、どの理論を採用するのかの基準は何になるのか。おそらく彼にとっては、基準は、観察言明も含めた言語内の整合性になるだろう。デイヴィドソンの「青白い経験論 pallid empiricism」（論文「経験的内容」）

2 問答の観点からの意味論
A アトミズムから全体論への変化
（1）語ではなくて、文を言語的な意味の単位とする
　　　ベンサムに始まる（クワイン「経験論の二つのドグマ」）。カントに始まる（ブランダム、MIE）。
　　　フレーゲの文脈原理、デイヴィドソンによる積木理論への批判
（2）意味の全体論、正当化の全体論（検証主義批判）
B 問答の観点からの呼応
（1）問いと発話：発話は問いへの答えとして意味を持つ（コリングウッド・テーゼ）
（2）問いと推論：推論は問いに答えるプロセスとして成立する

付録　（タイチュラロン大学での 2016 年発表原稿）
Are deictic and anaphoric uses distinguishable?

1　Explanation of the problem

The correspondence theory of truth of propositions has been criticized in many ways yet, still, it persists, due to the ordinary experience of language words referring to extra-linguistic objects. How, then, can we explain the use of words that seem to refer to objects in a compatible way, employing criticism of the correspondence theory of truth? W. Quine's (CITE) 'inscrutability of reference' argument and D. Davidson's (CITE) 'realism without reference' perspective examine this phenomenon within the confines of conflicting arguments.

Robert Brandom divides reference by words into extra-linguistic reference (deictic use) and intra-linguistic reference (anaphoric use) and claims that the deictic use presupposes the anaphoric use. [1]　This argument presents an explanation of reference use of words that corresponds to criticism

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[1]　Cf. R. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, Harvard UP, 1994, p. 464.

of the correspondence theory.

This paper will extend the above argument examining various angles and outcomes.

2 What is anaphora?

(1) Definition of anaphora

Anaphora is 'linguistic element which refers back to another linguistic element (**antecedent)** in the coreferential relationship, i.e. the **reference** of an anaphora can only be ascertained by interpreting its antecedent'. *Cataphora* is a linguisitic element which refers forward to a postcedent. Anaphora in a broad sense subsume both forward and backward reference.

(*Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics,* 1996)

Pronominal anaphora:

(1)   John left. He said he was ill.

(The antecedent is "John" and the anaphoric expression is "he".)

VP anaphora (also called *VP ellipsis*):

(2)   Mary Anne took out the garbage. Claudia did too.

(The antecedent is "took out the garbage" and the anaphoric expression a null VP.)

Propositional anaphora:

(3)   One plaintiff was passed over for promotion three times. But the jury didn't believe this.

(The antecedent is the proposition expressed by the first sentence. The anaphoric expression is "this".)

Adjectival anaphora:

(4)   A kind stranger returned my wallet. Such people are rare. (The antecedent is "kind stranger" and the anaphoric expression "such".)

Kind-level anaphora:

(5)   John gave a presentation. Sarah gave one too. (The antecedent is "a presentation", and the anaphoric expression is "one".)

There are another types of anaphora, like temporal anaphora and modal anaphora, etc.

(From 'Anaphora' in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

(2) Semantics of anaphoric pronouns

The semantics of such anaphoric pronouns is very simple: the referent of the anaphoric pronoun is the referent of its antecedent.

The sense of such anaphoric pronouns, therefore, is to refer to the same referent as its antecedent. In such a case, the aforementioned anaphoric pronoun is context sensitive, similar to indexicals and demonstratives. E.g., 'That' has two kinds of use, a deictic use and

an anaphoric use. The deicitic use of 'that' is demonstrative and needs an associated demonstration like pointing an object. The anaphoric use of 'that' is also context sensitive and has the same referent as its antecedent. Thus that has a 'character' in Kaplan' terminology. If its antecedent is a proper name, an indexical, or a demonstrative, the character of 'that' is to refer the referent of the antecedent of 'that'. If its antecedent is a definite description, the character of 'that' is to have the same sense as that of the antecedent of 'that'.

#**Anaphora is not metalanguage.**
An anaphora depends on but does not refer to the antecedent.
'I bought an apple yesterday. That was very delicious.'
That is the anaphor and its antecedent is *an apple*. But *that* does not refer to the phrase *an apple,* because the phrase *an apple* is not delicious. Rather, *that* refers to the apple suggested by the antecedent *an apple*.

If a meta-language refers to an expression of its object language, it is a kind of extra-linguistic reference for the meta-language, which is different from anaphoric use.

2   Significant uses of anaphora
Anaphora can seem to be an unimportant and a parasitic use of expression. However, it is a very significant and fundamental use of language with regard to a proper name, a question-answer relationship, a rule following problem, and the ability to learn language.

#**Explanation of Proper name**
Kripke explained the reference of proper names by chains of causality. Brandom explains the reference of proper names by chains of anaphora. If it is correct we can apply it to the account of natural kinds. Further we could explain every common noun by chains of anaphora.

#**Every question-answer relation presupposes anaphora.**
'Do you like licorice？'
'Yes, I like it.' or 'Yes, I do.'
'Which is your car?'
'It is that red car.'
The answer must repeat some part of the question and this repeated part is an anaphor.

Every inference presupposes anaphora.
Consider the following syllogism;
Socrates is a human.
Every human is mortal.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Socrates in the conclusion needs to be an anaphor of *Socrates* in the minor premise because there are

many people with the name *Socrates*. In order to refer to the same person we need an anaphoric mechanism. If *human* is ambiguous, then using the term in the major premise needs to be an anaphor of it in the minor premise. The same thing is valid for *mortal*.

In order for an inference to be valid, words that occur more than twice must have the same content or referent, i.e., they must be anaphoric.

#Bound variables are anaphoric.

E.g., $\forall x$ （F x→G x）

We understand this formula as follows.

For all x if x is F then x is G.

The second *x* and third *x* are anaphors of the first *x*[2].

Following rules presupposes anaphora.

If the word 'plus' is not used according to the rule, the use of the word *plus* would then be considered wrong. Even such use is also an anaphoric use of *plus*. Thus, the anaphoric mechanism would be more fundamental than the language rules.

#Learning languages presuppose anaphora.

In the process of learning expressions it is necessary to repeat words and phrases. Such repetitions are considered anaphoric uses.

3 We cannot distinguish a deictic use and an anaphoric use.

(1)Brandom's Argument

Brandom argues that a deictic mechanism presupposes an anaphoric mechanism[3]. Demonstrative tokening or indexical tokening are not repeatable; however, they can be repeated by anaphors. "Without the possibility of anaphoric extension and connection through recurrence to other tokenings, deictic tokenings can play no significant semantic role, not even a deictic one' and there is 'no (semantic significant) occurrence without (the possibility of) recurrence" (465).

(2) 'Pure' deictic use presupposes the anaphoric mechanism.

Deictic use of an indexical

As Kaplan claimed, an indexical *I* refers to an object in a given context by its character. The character *I* is commonly defined as follows:

I refers to the speaker or writer of the relevant occurrence of the word *I*[4]

The second *I* is an anaphoric use, and its antecedent is the first *I*. The second *I* refers to the first and, to understand the character of an indexical, we need an anaphora. Thus, the deictic use of *I* presupposes the anaphoric mechanism. We can say similar things about other indexicals such as *here*, and *now*.

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[2] Cf. Quine, *Word and Object*, MIT UP, *1960*, Chap. IV, Sec. 28.

[3] R. Brandom, *Ibid.* pp. 464-468.

[4] D. Kapan, 'Demonstratives' in Themes from Kaplan, p. 505.

Deictic use of demonstratives

Demonstratives require associated demonstration. Kaplan explains the standard form for demonstrations:

> The individual that has appearance A from here now. [5]

An explanation of demonstratives with associated demonstration presupposes the understanding of *here* and *now*. Therefore, use of demonstratives presupposes use of indexicals. As we saw above, use of the indexical presupposes the anaphoric use and, therefore, deictic use of demonstratives presupposes an anaphoric mechanism.

Context is articulated by language

The contents of indexicals and demonstratives are specified by characters and contexts. The context is the situation that is specified by a quadruple (speaker, time, place, world) and articulated by language. Thus, indexicals and demonstratives can demonstrate by a presupposition of the linguistically-articulated situation.

How can the linguistically articulated object be demonstrated?

I refers to the speaker who uses the term.

This is a definite description; however, *I* and the definite description do not have the same sense. Kaplan criticized Reichenbach because of this lack of a similar sense. However, to understand the character of *I*, definite description must be intimately understood.

(3)Deixis and Which-question

'Which is his car?

'It is that'

A question with a interrogative 'which' asks to refer an object. It answer presents a deictic expression like a demonstrative. In this case the 'that' succeed to refer an object, because 'It' is an anaphor of 'his car' and 'that' must refer his car.

the question-answer relation presupposes anaphora. The reference by 'that' in the answer presupposes the anaphoric relation which makes the question-answer relation possible.

4 Conclusion

I explained that the deictic mechanism always presupposes the anaphoric mechanism or is combined with it. The anaphoric use, however, is not always combined with deictic use because there are anaphoric uses that have antecedents that are not expressions referring to something. They refer to verb phrases, adjective phrases, adverb phrases and more. For example: 'Do you like it', 'Yes, I do.' 'Do you think it difficult?' 'Yes, I think so.' Deictic uses are thus not distinguished from anaphoric uses, but cannot express the converse proposition. Some anaphoric uses are distinguished from deictic uses.

I wanted to criticize realism and the correspondence theory of truth and for that I wanted to argue that

(1) the deictic use presupposes the anaphoric use

(2) the deictic use is not distinguished from the anaphoric use and a kind of anaphoric use.

I have argued (1) but not (2). Today's talk is on the half way to the goal.

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[5] *Ibid.,* p. 526)